Musk did not get to elaborate on the complexities of his manufacturing facility setup, however he did level out one specific failure: the ability at one level used a “crazy, complex network of conveyor belts, and it was not working so [Tesla] got rid of the whole thing.”
That Musk would’ve chosen to depend on a extremely automated facility is little shock. During a shareholder assembly in 2016, he excitedly famous that he thinks of the manufacturing facility itself as a product with the potential for super breakthroughs. “We realized that the true problem, the true difficulty, and where the greatest potential is – is building the machine that makes the machine,” Musk stated. “In other words, it’s building the factory.”
Musk’s plan to craft the machine that builds machines solely picked up steam when Tesla acquired Perbix, an automatic manufacturing firm that Tesla had long-running enterprise ties with. While the transfer allowed Tesla to being extra element manufacturing in-house, it may need prompted nonetheless extra issues — Tesla quickly suspended Model three manufacturing for a week in February partly to “improve automation.” It appears clear that Musk hasn’t but struck the correct steadiness between machines and the roughly 10,000 human staff on the Fremont manufacturing facility.
Just to be clear although, a surfeit of robots is not the one motive Tesla has constantly fallen wanting its manufacturing objectives. On the corporate’s most up-to-date earnings name, Musk candidly identified that points with battery module manufacturing on the firm’s Gigafactory in Nevada was the “limiting factor” in Model three output.
“We were probably a little overconfident, a little complacent, in thinking this is something we understand,” he stated on the time. “We put a lot of attention on other things and just got too comfortable with our ability to do battery modules, because we’ve been doing that since the start of the company.”